Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

Leonard M. Olson v. Independent Order of
Foresters and Thomas McGahan : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Albert R. Bowen; Robert Bigelow;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Olson v. Independent Order of Foresters, No. 8668 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2826

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

JA1·~ 1 j

1958

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
1?-1''

~ L~ t" l
r·

r:~~

l:

~J!

LEO·NARD M. OLSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
INDEPENDENT ORDER OF FORESTERS, a corporation, and THOMAS
McGAHAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 8668

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

UNIVERSITY U.TA.H

l:iAYt L.fBRAa·\ y

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
ALBERT R. BOWEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
ROBERT BIGELOW,
of Counsel

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------STATEMENT OF POINTS ------------·---~------------------POINT I --------------------------------------------------.--------.---~~<:i~MENT -----------------------------------------------------------POINT I --------------------------------------------------·-----------CONCL~SI<=>N ----------------------------------------------------------

PAGE
1

3
3
~
~
~

CASES CITED
Cloon v. Gerry, 13 Gray, Mass., 201__________________________

8

Dunn v. E. E. Gray Co., Mass., 150 N. E. 166________
Giusti v. Del Papa, R.I., 33 A. 525_____________________________

7
7-8

Graham v. Buffalo General Laundries Corporation,
N. Y., 18 4 N. E. 746_____________________________________________

7

Johnston v. Meaghr, 14 ~tah 426, 47 P. 861____________ 7
Kennedy v. Burbidge, 54 ~tah 4~7, 183 P. 325________ ~-5-7
McElroy v. Catholic Press, Ill., ~8 N. E. 527______________ 5
Miller v. ~unkle, Iowa, 114 N. W. 611____________________ 5
Penton v. Canning, Wyo., 118 P. 2d 1 005__________________ 6-8
Ross v. Hixon, Kan., 2 6 P. 9 5 5----------------------------------- 6-7
Stainer v. San Louis Valley Land & Mining Co., 8th
C. C. A., 166 F. 220________________________________________________ 7
Staton v. Mason, N.Y., 104 N.Y. S. 157_________________

5

Van Sant v. Am. Exp-ress Co., 15 8 Fed. 2d ~2~,
3 rd C. C. A. ------------------------------------------------------White v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., Ore.,

8

~0

p. 2d 1 ~ 3---------------------------------------------------------

7

TEXTS CITED
14 ALR 2d, 312, Sec. 13------------------------------------Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5-7

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

LEONARD M. OLSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
INDEPENDENT ORDER OF FORESTERS, a corporation, and THOMAS
McGAHAN,

Case No. 8668

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts involved in this appeal are few.
Briefly stated they are as follows: (We will refer to the
parties as they appeared below.)
The plaintiff was charged with embezzlement upon a
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complaint which was issued by the County Attorney of Salt
Lake County and signed by Thomas McGahan, field auditor
for the defendant. (Tr. 48-49) Upon this complaint the
plaintiff was arrested and brought before the Honorable
Leland G. Larsen, City Judge and Committing Magistrate
for Salt Lake County, and released to the custody of his
attorney. (Tr. 114) Sometime later a preliminary hearing
on the criminal charge was held by Judge Larsen. At this
hearing witnesses were called by the State and the plaintiff,
and plaintiff also testified in his ovtn defense. (Tr. 115) Mter
the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, plaintiff was bound
over for trial upon a certificate of probable cause. (Tr. 114115, 129, 130) Plaintiff was later tried before the Honorable
Ray VanCott, Jr. At-tne-~_l~_sio~of the State's~yi4~!1_c~,
plaintiff moved to dis_nll~s. This motion was denied. (Tr.
189--190). Th;-c-~e- was submittedto-tlie jury which duly
acquitted the plaintiff.~
~
-.....
Following the acquittal this action was commenced
against the defendant and Thomas McGahan. The latter was
never served with Summons and the case proceeded to trial
against the defendant, Independent Order of Foresters.
~

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, defendant
moved for a directed verdict whereupon the court dismissed
the jury and dismissed the complaint. (Tr. 189-191) The
complaint was dismissed upon the ground that the binding
over of the plaintiff was a finding of probable cause and, in
the abse~ce of evidence showing that the order binding the
plaintiff over to answer the criminal charge was obtained
by fraud, misrepresentation, perjured evidence or other undue or unfair
practiced Or induced by -defe~d~t,
constituted a complete defense to plaintiff's charge of malicious prosecution. No evide'nce of any kind was offered

meat1S
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by plaintiff to prove that the order binding the plaintiff over
for trial was tainted in any way by any improper act of
defendant which induced or caused the Committing Magistrate to order plaintiff held for trial before the District
Court or that plaintiff would not have been bound over
except for such improper acts of defendant. No evidence
was offered by defendant in its own defense.
The foregoing facts are the only ones relevant or necessary to be considered in deciding the correctness of the trial
court's ruling. Because we think a recital of any other facts
would only burden the court and be of no value in clarifying
the issue to be decided here, we will omit any further reference to th.em. However, defendant does not accept as accurate or correct many of the facts set out in plaintiff's
brief which statement defendant believes is not supported
by the record in many important and vital particulars.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL
COURT
DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-,_....,._
lNG DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS WITHOUT_ DISPUTE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE WAS
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
PLAINTIFF WAS BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL AND
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS RESULTED
FROM FRAUD, FALSE OR PERJURED TESTIMONY
OR OTHER UNDUE MEANS PRACTICED BY DEFENDANT.
~

-

___

~_

~.-~

--

---·- -·-

....
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECT VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS WITHOUT DISPUTE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE WAS
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
PLAINTIFF WAS BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL AND
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS PJ:SULTED
FROM FRAUD, FALSE OR PERJURED TESTIMONY
OR OTHER UNDUE MEANS PRACTICED BY DEFENDANT.
The d~fendant rests its case for affirmance upon the
proposition that -whenlJlainti:ff was bound over by }udg~-
Larsen-for-- trial upon theca~ plaint charging elll.bezzlement
that order constituted a finding of _ P_!'<?bable cause for the
issuance 'of the complaim as-~- ~atter ~f-Ta~.- 'thefeatte;this finding of probable ~~e c~l<.r only be--overco:meby
competent evidence that the order was obtained by fraud,
misrepresentation, perjured testimony or other undue means
practiced or brought about or caused by defendant. (Ken-.;
(nedy"1/. Burbidge, 54 Utah 497, 183 P. 325.
~
"'-4:tt....._ ..,

The plaintiff made no attempt to overcome this finding
by any evidence whatsoever. It is asserted by plaintiff that
the order of the Committing Magistrate was only prima facie
evidence of probable cause which was overcome by plaintiff's evidence. We thus have the issue squarely presented as
to what is the legal effect of an order binding a defendant
over to answer criminal charges? Defendant does not conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tend that an order binding a defendant over in a criminal
proceeding is more than prima facie proof of probable cause.
Even a judgment of conviction has no greater effe~t than
to establish such prima" facie defep.se.---Kennedy V.-Burbidge,
supra; Staton v. Mason, N. Y., 104 N. Y. S. 157; McElroy
v. Catholic Press, Ill., 98 N. E. 527; Miller v. Runkle, Iowa,
114 N. W. 611. What we do contend, however, is that it
requires more than an acquittal by a jury to overthrow the
presumption of probable cause and that no evidence of
plaintiff's innocence, no matter how strong, will overthrow
this presumption unless associated and connected with such
evidence of innocence there is further competent evidence
which shows that such order was obtained by fraud, perjury
or other undue or unfair means. Kennedy v. Burbidge,
supra; McElroy v. Catholic Press, supra.
The plaintiff seeks to establish a distinction between a
case where a plaintiff has_been c~n-~~~-ted which conviction is
lat!.r set aside or reversed and a case where a plaintiff has been
4eld on the order of a Committing Mag~strate . for trial. We
thi~k the distinction sought to be made is tenuous and without substance and is contrary to the better authority.
Many cases support the defendant in the contention that
an order of a Committing Magistrate binding a defendant
over has the same effect as a conviction. In 14_ALR
2d,312,
--·
Sec. 13, the author says:
.

((Although there is authority to the contrary, the
numerical weight of authority, at least, is to the effect
that where the complaint in an action for malicious
prosecution shows on its face that a committing magistrate found probable cause to bind plaintiff over to
a higher court, or that the grand jury indicted,-~~~
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plain tiff must, in his pleading, g() --- f"LJ.xth~r than _a
mere allegation of want of probable cause, and m~t
plead --facts showing fraud or othe~_ improper means
to overcome ~h~ presumption of probable cau~~Jir~jng
from the fact that he was bound ovei-oy-tJ1e magistrate or indicted by the grand jury."
In the case of Penton v. Canning, Wyo., 118 P. 2d 1005,
the plaintiff sought to make the same distinction which the
plaintiff here asserts must be made between a case where there
is an order holding a plaintiff for trial and a case where a
judgment of conviction has been obtained. That court reviewed the authorities and rejected the distinction and criticized the case of Ross v. Hixon, Ka.n., 26 P. 955, upon which
the plaintiff here relies. That court said:
((It is urged for the plaintiff and respondent,
Penton, that there is a (clear distinction which is made
in the authorities between cases in which the committing magistrate has jurisdiction to and does finally,
try, determine and convict the defendant and cases
in which he merely sits as a committing magistrate',
and the rule announced in Ross v. Hixon, supra, is
insisted upon as the correct rule to govern the case at
bar.
So far as the Ross v. Hixon case is concerned,
it is, we think, sufficient to say that in Giusti v. Del
Papa, supra, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
pointedly criticises the position taken in the Hixon
case, saying: (With all due deference, we feel constrained, for the reasons that we have given, to dissent
from this conclusion. We do not think it follows
that, because the binding over is orily prima facie
evidence of probable cause, it is not necessary to attack it in the petition for fraud or undue mean-s-; or,
in other words, to aver such fraud or undU.e --means
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to negative its effect. The pleader must state a_ cause
of action, and he fails to d_o so_ u_nless he overthrows
the j)rima -ficie effect of probabl~ cause arising from
the binding over.'' * * *
Relative to there being_ any __ (clear distinction'
so far as iiaffects the matter of properly alleging the
element of probable cause in a malicious prosecution
action, as plaintiff urges and above recited, we are
unable to see that that is so."
See also Graham v. Buffalo General Laundries Corporation,
N. Y., 184 N. E. 746; Dunn v. E. E. Gray Co., Mass., 150
N. E. 166; Giusti v. Del Papa, R.I., 33 A. 525; White v.
Pacific Telephone f5 Telegraph Co., Ore., 90 P. 2d 193. See
also the dissenting opinion of Phillips in Stainer v. San Louis
Valley Land f5 Mining Co., 8th C. C. A., 166 F. 220. There
are many other cases cited in 14 A. L. R. 2d, supra.
Plaintiff relies ~P()P. ]()_hnston v. Meaghr, 14 Utah 426,
47 P. 861. This-~-~se goes no further than to say that the
orders of magistrates binding defendants over on preliminary
examinations are not conclusive but only furnish a prima
facie presumption of p~obable cause. To this extent the case
is in harmony with the Kennedy case. To the extent that
it holds that evidence should be submitted to the jury
that there was or was not probable -cause without a showing
of fraud, false testimony, etc. it is overruled by the Kennedy
c~-~~ and is not authority in this jurisdiction.
The other cases on this point relied upon by plaintiff,
notably,_Ross v. Hixon, supra, are either not in point or represent a minority view.
There is no reason in logic why the finding of probable
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cause by a committing magistrate should not have the same
effect as a con-viction after a trial.- The -auihorities relied
upon -by- defendant so-hold. Penton v. Canning, supra, and
Giusti v. Del Papa, supra. The very purpose of a preliminary
hearing is to determine if there is cause to prosecute the party
charged with a criminal offense. If the committing magistrate so finds then it should require as much evidence to
overcome the prima facie effect of the order binding the
defendant over as in the case of a conviction. It is no answer
for plaintiff to assert, with no evidence or foundation in
the record to support the claim, that preliminary hearings
before justices are informal and lacking in judicial climate.
The record in the case shows that the plaintiff was accorded
a hearing, that he called witnesses and testified himself. Furthermore, it is a fact well known to this Court that Judge
Larsen, by whom plaintiff was committed, was a judge
learned in the law and with many years of experience in
presiding at trials of both civil and criminal cases. The argument of plaintiff is an attack upon the integrity of the
approved judicial processes of this State.
There is an additional reason why the proposition contended for by plaintiff should not receive judJcial·~~~~tion in
this State. Actions for malicious prosecution are not fayQ.r_ed
in the law and are to be managed with great _c;~~t-~~!1· See
Penton v. Canning, supra; Van Sant v. A1n. Express Co.,
158 Fed. 2d 924, 3rd C. C. A.; and Cloon v. Gerry, 13 Gray,
Mass., 201.
It would constitute a serious threat to the administration of justice to open the door to such actions if, every time
a jury in a criminal case turns a defendant loose, no matter
what the reason, including sympathy, he might with im-
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punity turn around and sue the one who had courage enough
to sign the complaint, for malicious prosecution ~ithotl.!_
being also required to show in addition to acquittal, that his
IJei~g held for trial was the result of improper acts committed
by _ _ th~__Q~fendant in securing such binding over.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as the plaintiff was bound over for trial on
the charge of embezzlement, which constituted a finding
of probable cause, and there is no evidence to rebut the prima
facie defense of probable cause thereby established by a showing that the order binding plaintiff over was obtained by
fraud, perjured testimony or other unfair or undue means,
the judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's complaint was proper and must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
ALBERT R. BOWEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
ROBERT BIGELOW,
of Counsel
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